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SUMMARY ARGUMENT 
As this court will learn by Third District Judge Randall N. Skanchy's review and 
findings of the Appellant's State Habeas Petition of December 9, 2009 that: "the Court 
finds that the claims are not frivolous on their fact." However, instead of ordering an 
evidentiary hearing on such type of meritorious claims of the Appellant's State Petition, 
he arbitrarily granted the State's Motion For Summary Judgement. Thus, because of the 
above arbitrary summary dismissal of the Appellant's State Petition, the Appellant now 
hereby respectfully demands in this appeal of 2011, that the Utah Supreme Court re-
examine not only the entire case and unlawful 1983 conviction of a capital first degree 
murder, but also his 2005 indeterminate sentence of life imprisonment with the possibility 
of parole and original 1983 state conviction on capital murder be reversed in its entirety 
and that he either be granted a new trial on the grounds that his death penalty sentence 
was erroneously reversed on three prongs Brady v. Maryland, 373 U.S. 83 (1963), 
violations in his 1983 jury trial which this court merely had his 1983 unlawful death 
penalty sentence reduced. Which in reality, under each of the three Brady violations 
which were all found to exist in the Appellant, Tillman's 1983 death penalty trial and case 
this State Supreme Court should order that the Appellant either be given: (1) a complete 
new trial; (2) that his death sentence of 1983 be reduced to either a second degree murder 
conviction or manslaughter. See State v. Tillman, 750 P.2d 546, Id. at 590-91 (Utah 
1987), dissenting rulings of Justice Durham and Justice Zimmerman; or (3) that the 
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Appellant be released from prison on the grounds of being unlawfully confined on an 
unlawful "defective information" death sentence for over 28 years, that which was 
obtained by the State through illegal methods, particularly in violating Appellant, federal 
and state constitutional rights under the United States Supreme Court prongs, standards 
and tests of Brady v. Maryland. 373 U.S. 83 (1963); Giglio v. United States. 405 U.S. 
373, U.S. 83 (1963), Giglio v. United States. 405 U.S. 150 (1972), United States v. Agurs. 
427 U.S. at 112 (1976), United States v. Baglev. 473 U.S. 473 U.S. 667 at 676 (1985). 
Where according to each of these U.S. Supreme Court Decisions, they require that the 
Appellant, ElRoy Tillman, be given a "new trial" instead of the State merely reducing his 
1983 "death sentence" reduced to life imprisonment with the possibility of parole in 2005. 
As shown to have occurred in the instant case before this appellate court today. In 
comparing Bank v. Dretke. 540 U.S. 668, 124 S.Ct. 1251 (2004). After the accused failed 
to obtain relief in direct appeal and in two state post conviction proceedings, the accused, 
in a third state post conviction proceeding, included Brady claims concerning two key 
witnesses. (1) This claim was that the prosecution - in asserted violation of due process 
clauses of the federal constitution Fourteenth Amendment as construed in Brady v. 
Maryland. 373 U.S. 83, 83 S.Ct. 1994 (1963) - - had concealed from jury credibility 
impeachment evidence, in the form of a pre-trial incomplete transcripts and tape 
recording would revealing that the chief witness trial testimony had been intensively 
coached by prosecutor's and law-enforcement officers. Thus, prosecutions explained to 
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the jury the "missing secret recording and incomplete pre-trial transcripts of its OWN 
State Chief Witness, of which he made himself in secret." Through Tillman's direct 
appeal, and post conviction's state prosecutors Mr. Christensen continued to hold secret 
pre-trial transcripts and tape recording links his star chief witness Ms. Sager to Sgt. Ken 
Thirst. Tillman alleged as well that during the guilt phase of his trial, the state 
deliberately withheld information "Critical to the Jury's Assessment of the Actions and 
Credibility" including the prosecutors lying about the secret tape recording in which he 
made that - - came up missing. Tillman as Afro-American, request in the interest of 
justice, fairness and equal protection of the law clauses, of this miscarriage of justice . . . 
Grounds for post-conviction relief in Utah include circustance in which "the conviction 
was obtained or the sentence was imposed in violation of the United States Constitution 
or the Utah Constitute." Utah Code Ann. 78-35-a-104(l)(A)( 1996). The Fourteenth 
Amendment to the United States Constitute and Article I Section 7 of the Utah 
Constitution accord due process rights to an accused. These rights are violated when the 
state withholds material favorable mitigate evidence from defense counsel at trial. 
Moreover, the defective information failure to charge "essential elements" of the offense 
constitutes a jurisdictional defect. United States v. Fitzgerald, 89 F.3d 218 at 221 (5th Cir. 
1996); Russell v. United States. 369 U.S. 749, 769-70 (1962). See, Exhibits (A-B-C-D & 
F). 
STANDARD OF REVIEW 
4 
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In Appellant's appeal now filed before this court today his case must be re-viewed 
by the court on the grounds that the third district court Judge Randall N. Skanchy's Dec 9, 
2010, findings, conclusions and final order denying Appellant's State Habeas Petition is 
in error in erroneously claiming that "all of Tillman's claims are timed barred." 
Particularly, on Appellant's claim on (1) being unlawfully charged, tried and convicted on 
a defective information, and when in fact this particular claims is not time barred as it is a 
type of Plain Error Claims on Attacking a trial court Jurisdiction on being denied a fair 
trial state defective information and on the Appellant's Tillman's, trial counsel's failure to 
object to such as type of a defective charging document. Thus, the Appellant's here 
requests that this court review his entired case under Utah's Standard of Review for 
Correctness. "Compare Russell v. U.S., 369 U.S. 749, 769-70 (1962); see e.g., U.S. v. 
Glick, 142 F3.d 520, 523 (2d Cir. 1998) (defendant may challenge court's failure to 
charge with a crime because this is a jurisdictional defect that maybe raised on appeal 
despite defendant's failure to preserve the issue for appeal): see, e.g., U.S. v. Forbes, 16 
F.3d 1294, 1297 (1st Cir. 1994) (Objection that indictment failed to charge essential 
elements of reentry following deportation offense properly raised for first time on 
appeal); U.S. v. Ruelas, 106 F.3d 1416, 1418 (9th Cir. 1997); U.S. v. Gatewood, 173 F.3d 
983, 986 (6th Cir. 1999); Brady v. Maryland, 373 U.S. 83, 83 S.Ct. 1194 (1963). 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
1. The following are all cases related including prior appeals. State v. 
5 
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Tillman. 750 P.2d 546 (1987); Tillman v. Cook, 885 P.2d 211 (1993); 
Tillman v. Cook. 510 U.S. 1050 (1994); Tillman v. Cook, 215 F.3d 1116 
(10th Cir. 2000); Tillman v. Cook. U.S. , 121 S.Ct. 664 (2000); 
Tillman v. State. 128 P.3d 1123 (2005). 
2. Statement of facts. 
The Appellant was convicted of the following crimes: in 1983, was 
convicted for a capital crime of criminal homicide, first degree murder. In 2005, the 
result of a Brady v. Maryland, violation, it was set aside in the case of Tillman v. State. 
128 P.3d 1123 (Utah 2005). The Appellant received the following specific sentence: life 
imprisonment with the possibility of parole. 
On Dec. 9, 2010. Did the Third District Court trial judge 
Hon. Randall N. Skanchy, in reviewing the Appellant's post-
conviction state petition ERR in its final finding, conclusion, 
and order denying Appellant, Tillman's, State Habeas Petition 
without first granting the Appellant's motion for a State 
Evidentiary Hearing and Request for Appointment of 
Counsel? 
ISSUE 1: The Appellant answers "yes" to the above question on the grounds that the 
Third District Court Trial Judge, Hon. Skanchy's, errored in denying the Appellant's two 
motions for a State Evidentiary Hearing and Request for Appointment of Counsel, 
particularly, on the Appellant's claims that no Utah State Trial or Appellate Court has 
ever Squarely or Directly addressed his 1988 claims of being improperly unlawfully 
charged, tried, convicted, and then given an "unlawful death sentence" in 1983, that 
6 
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which was based on the State's "defective information" that failed to properly charge the 
Appellant with a "Capital Murder Offense." See exhibits (A; B; C; and D). 
In addition, the Appellant also claims in this appeal of the third district trial Judge 
Hon. Skanchy was in error in falsely claiming that "All of the Appellant, Tillman's claims 
of being denied a fair and just trial were all "time barred," particularly, when in view of 
the fact that Appellant's 1988 claims on unlawfully being tried, convicted, and then given 
an "unlawful death penalty sentence" that which was based on the State's defective 
information, "were not time barred" (and can be raised at any time) as these types of 
claims are claims that which are attacking the trial court's lack of jurisdiction and 
authority to try the Appellant with the "Essential Elements" of the crime of first degree 
Capital Murder to this day! Thus, it is a jurisdiction claim (question) of Utah's Trial 
Court not having legal jurisdiction to try the Appellant for a "Capital Crime." Compare 
Utah Code of Criminal Procedure Rule 22(e), nonetheless if anything, the Appellant 
asserts that the third district court trial Judge, Hon. Skanchy should of granted the 
Appellant a full and fair state Evidentiary Hearing on his claims of being unlawfully tried 
and convicted on the State Prosecutor, Michael Christensen's defective information. In 
fact, as all of the Appellant's trial and Appellate Court pleadings clearly show for over 29 
full years now, his claims on being erroneously charged for a "Capital Crime" has never 
been Squarely or Directly addressed by any trial or Appellate Court in the State of Utah. 
In fact, as the court records all clearly show, all that can be said before this Utah Supreme 
7 
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Court is that Utah's trial and Appellate Court's have each merely addressed this particular 
type of claim, in simply ruling that the State of Utah had properly charged the Appellant 
by way of Utah's MERGER DOCTRINE in lawfully trying the Appellant on his 1982 
Capital Crime of first degree murder. 
Thus, after serving over 29 full years of "Illegal Confinement" the Appellant again 
continues to raise his "None Time Barred" plain error claims being unlawfully confined, 
or, imprisoned on the State Prosecutor's 1982 Defective Information in not properly 
charging the Appellant for a "Capital Murder" crime in the first degree, even as found in 
the split Utah Supreme Court Opinions of now Chief Justice Durham ans Ex-Chief 
Justice Zimmerman, that the Appellant, EIRoy Tillman's, case warrants a complete 
reversal of his 1983 conviction for first degree Murder; and further that the 1983 State 
Conviction and Prison Sentence should be reduced from being a capital crime to a 
manslaughter. Compare Cone v. Bell 129 S.Ct. 1759 (2009) (Holdings that failing to 
address raised issues or claims are error). Compare Apprendi v. New Jersey, 530 U.S. 
(2000) id. At 43 (every offense consists of certain acts done or omitted under certain 
circumstances; and in an information for the offense, it is not sufficient to charge the 
defendant generally with have committed it,. . . but all facts and circumstances 
constituting the offense must be specially set forth"); id. at 180 ("Every Offense Consists 
of Certain Acts done or Omitted, under Certain Circumstances, all of which must be 
stated in the information . . . and be proved as laid"). Comparing U.S. v. Cobrera-Teran, 
8 
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
168F.3dl41, 143-44 (5th Cir. 1999); U.S. v. DuBo, 186 F.3d 1117, 1179 (9th Cir. 1999), 
'court held: if properly challenged prior to trial, an information complete failure to 
"Recite an Essential Element of the Charged Offense" is not a minor or technical flaw 
subject to harmless error analysis but a fatal flaw requiring dismissal of the information. 
Compare State v. Topham, 123 P.888, 41 Utah 39 (1912); People v. Hill 3 P.75, 3 Utah 
334 (Utah 1984); Comparing Russell v. U.S., 369 U.S. 749, 769-70 (1962). The Utah 
Supreme Court stated: "that the availability of a bill of particulars will "not cure an 
indictment that omits an "Essential Element" of the offense." See: Exhibits A-B-C-D-F. 
Appellant Asserts That This Case Meets The Three 
Prong BRADY Violation Standard and Tests 
Issue 2: Appellant now asserts that not only that his entire criminal case was prejudiced 
because of the state prosecutor's knowingly and intentional suppression of mitigating 
evidence in his case, in direct violation of Brady v. Maryland, 373 U.S. 83 (1963), and 
Gigliov. U.S., 405 U.S. 150, 154 (1972); Napur v. Illinois. 360 U.S.264, at 271 (1959); 
U.S. v. Baglev, 473 U.S. 667 (1985). Pre-Trial Rights. 
In addition, in the State Summary Judgement Motion, filed April 20, 2010, id. At 
10. The State argued that the Appellant, EIRoy Tillman, never proved that he could not 
have discovered it in time to raise his claim in his first - post conviction action. Tillman, 
2005 Ut. 56, 17-18. The state stands by the argument, "although the Supreme Court did 
not resolve that issue." On the three prong Brady v. Maryland, violation of (1) Pre-Trial 
9 
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suppression of Mitigating Evidence, including pre-transcripts incomplete. (2) The use of 
perjured testimony; and there the withholding impeachment evidence. And since the 
State attorney, Thomas A. Brunker, admits to the third district court, in his above-stated 
Argument requesting Summary Judgement of the Appellant's Case, of April 10, 2010, 
that this State Supreme Court has never resolved the BRADY violation issues involving 
the Appellant's appeal before this court today. Then in accordance to the U.S. Supreme 
Court's decision in Brady v. Maryland, Supra, (1963) in Napur v. Illinois, Supra, (1959); 
and in Giglio v. U.S., Supra (1972). Including in the U.S. v. Baglev, Supra, (1985) 
decision, this Utah Supreme Court is required to abide by the holdings of these U.S. 
Supreme Court decisions when applying them to the Appellant, Tillman's, case on appeal 
today by ordering that Appellant's case warrants either (1) a complete reversal of his 1983 
conviction of capital first degree murder. (2) A new trial, (3) or a prison sentence 
reduction from life with the possibility of parole, or in the alternative to a conviction of 
manslaughter. 
Issue 3: Appellant further asserts in this appeal that Utah's State Prosecutor, a Mr. 
Michael Christensen, had knowingly and intentionally violated Appellants federal and 
state constitutional rights to effective assistance of his 1983 trial attorneys, where he and 
his state prosecution team "Inferred with the ability of Appellant trial counsel's ability to 
make independent pre-trial and actual trial decisions on how to prepare and thus conduct 
the Appellant, EIRoy Tillman's, pre and actual trial defenses to not having committing 
10 
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"An Aggravated Capital Murder Offense." For example, such as knowingly and 
intentionally suppression (mitigating) evidence during the Appellant's 1983 trial, and 
where as also shown in the third district court's ruling in Tillman v. State, 128P.3d 1123 
id at 3, 9 (Utah 2005), "where if found that the state prosecutor, Michael Christensen, did 
in fact, knew that: A tape recording of Sgt. Ken Thirst's polygraph testing interview with 
the State's chief prosecution witness, Ms. Sager's was in 'Existence' at the time. But 
when at trial, the State introduced testimony that "NO RECORDING" of the interview of 
Ms. Sager's, was ever made! See; Tillman v. State, Supra, id at 3, 9. Such is the true 
nature of the State using perjured testimony to convict the Appellant of Capital first 
degree murder. Therefore, as indicated above, the State prosecutor, Michael 
Christensen's failure to be honest, failure to disclose the State's "Suppressed Pre-Trial 
Transcripts and Tape Recording to his Trial Attorneys!" Also had the effect of denying 
The Appellant's Tillman his state and federal constitutional rights to ineffective 
assistance of counsel particularly in the State's allowing the Sgt. Ken Thirst to knowingly 
commit perjury in his trial testimony that his conversations with the State's chief witness, 
Ms. Sagers, were not recorded, including where the state prosecutor Christensen, himself 
in 1983, also committed perjury in falsely stating on record that he was unaware that a 
recording or transcripts of the interview with Ms. Sagers, had ever been made and 
because of it, in turn, gave both the Appellant's trial judge, jury's the fact finder, and his 
trial attorney's all the false impression and belief that there were no undisclosed pre-trial 
11 
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recordings and transcripts of police interviews of the State's chief witness, Ms. Sagers! 
When in fact Utah's Supreme Court knows particularly from it own split court ruling in 
the Appellant, Tillman, case over the last 23 years. That in State v. Tillman, 750 P.d 543, 
id at 583-91 (Utah 1987). The chief prosecutor, Michael Christensen's did in fact know 
who was doing the "State Secret Suppressed Tape Recording, and Pre-Trial Transcripts of 
the Police Interviews with Ms. Sagers." The reality is it was himself!! 
Thus, the Appellant in his Appeal Brief with this court today clearly shows not 
only how the State had used "Perjured Testimony" of the police Sgt. Ken Thirst, and of 
the prosecutor, Michael Christensen, to obtain a conviction of capital first degree murder 
of the Appellant, but as well knowingly and intentionally committing "Plain Error" in 
denying the Appellant's trial attorneys from being able to provide him with effective 
assistance of counsel, as well as a fair and just trial. Compare Napur v. Illinois, 360 U.S. 
264 (1959); Giglio v. U.S., 405 U.S. 150, 154 (1972) (holding that support the 
Appellant's claims that his conviction of 1983, must be either reversed or that he be 
granted a new trial as mandated in the above cited U.S. Supreme Court decisions, 
including Brady v. Maryland, 373 U.S. 83, 88 (1963); U.S. v. Baglev, 473 U.S. 667,673 
(1985); citing of Napur v. Illinois, 360 U.S. 264, 269 (1959) ("The jury's estimate of thee 
truthfulness and reliability of a given witness may well be determinative of guilt or 
innocence, and it is upon such subtle factor as the possible interest of the witness 
testifying falsely that a defendant's life or liberty may depend"). See Brown v. 
12 
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Wainwright 785 F.2 1457, 1464 (11th Cir. 1986) (Government has duty not to present 
false evidence, citing Giglio, Supra, id at 150 (1972); and with Brady, Supra, id at 83 
(1963). Where Justice Harlan conceds that the State may not knowingly use perjured 
testimony or allow it to remain uncorrected, as had occurred in Appellant's case on 
convicting him on evidence that is false; and as well non-existent in the Appellant ElRoy 
Tillman's 1983 trial record, including at the Appellant's 2000 state Evidentiary Hearing 
before the Honorable Third District Court former Judge Lewis. 
It took Appellant Tillman, 23 years to uncover prosecution 
misconduct of perjury and pre-trial suppression of mitigating 
evidence and other types of plain error to learn that this case 
is one of a complete miscarriage of justice, especially in 
denying him a just and fair trial that which was based on a 
wrongful criminal capital charge of capital murder 
Issue 4: Throughout the last 23 years, Appellant, Elroy Tillman's court appointed 
counsel's not only denied him effective assistance of counsel, such as during his "2005" 
re-sentencing hearing in failing to object to the State's defective Information of 1983, but 
as well, in also not demanding that the Appellant be granted a new trial on the grounds 
that the State prosecutor failed to provide to the defense "Mitigating Evidence" from his 
jury trial and Appellant court appointed attorneys. The injustice of being denied a 
constitutional right to a fair trial, is when State's prosecutor "lied," particularly, as shown 
in the Appellant case, where the State prosecutor, Michael Christensen, stood before the 
trial court, and his Empanelled Jury: Stating: "there was 'no' tape recording made 
of its own star witness when he knew it was "un-true." See; Tillman v. State, 128 P.3d 
13 
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1123, id at 3, 9, (2005). State v. Hales. 2007 Ut 14, 152 P.3d 321; State v. Martin, 44 
P.3d 805, 2002 Ut 34; State v. Rammasch, 775 P.2d 388, 407-08 (Utah 1989) (finding 
reversible error in a bench trial where the case hinged on the victim's testimony and the 
inadmissible evidence unfairly bolstered the victim's (credibility); Mitchell 779 P.2d is at 
1121-22 (finding prejudice where hypnotically-influenced testimony was used to bolster 
the state theory); State v. Sibert 310 P.2d 388, 390, 392-93 (Utah 1957). In effect, in 
1983, as shown over the last 29 years Appellant's trial and Appellant Attorneys have 
knowingly and intentionally allowed the Appellant's "case to sink into a type of legal 
entanglement, "to where no Utah court has ever Squarely or Directly addressed 
Appellant's 1983 claims of being improperly charged unlawfully tried, convicted and 
sentenced to a "death sentence" on not only the States "defective information." See 
Tillman v. Cook, 855 P.2d 211 (Utah 1993) Stewart, Justice (dissenting): is at 229, in 
addition, the damage from the fire was minor. There is no evidence that the damage 
exceed $5,000, the amount of damage a fire must cause to be a felony under the arson 
statute in effect at the time of the crime. Utah Code Ann. 76-6-102(2X1978). See 
Exhibit (E). Thus, the setting of the fire may only have constituted a misdemeanor. I 
cannot conclude that the legislature intend a misdemeanor to constitute an aggravating 
circumstance of capital homicide under Utah Code Ann. 76-5-202 (l)(d). See Exhibit (C). 
To so conclude would create a grave question as to the constitutionality of arson as an 
aggravating circumstance in a case such as this. Moreover, on the state Utah's Appellate 
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Court's 2005 still un-resolved issue of the Brady violation claims. Such as on whether or 
not Appellant, EIRoy Tillman, should have been granted a new trial instead of simply 
setting his 1983 "death sentence" aside. Compare: Brady v. Maryland. 373 U.S. 83. 
(1963); Memann v. Richarson. 398 U.S. 759, 771.N14 (1970); Earlev v. Issac. 456 U.S. 
107, 133-34 (1982); Cone v. Bell 129 S.Ct. 1769 (2009); Adams v. State. 2005 Ut 62, 
123 P.3d 400, 535 Ut. Adv. Rep. 15; Bundv v. DeLand. 763 P.2d 803, 805 (1988); State 
v. Chacon. 962 P.2d 48, 50 (1988); State v. Templin. 805 P.2d 182 (1990); Dye v. 
Halbauer. 546 U.S. 1. 3 (7005). 
From prosecution misconducts of perjury and pre-trial suppressions of mitigating 
evidence and other types of plain errors to court appointed attorney's and the Utah trial 
courts has made a mess of Appellant's case, blaming each other and not squarely or 
directly addressing the issues properly and fairly, raised in: Tillman. Supra (Utah 1993) 
quoting: Justice, Stewart (dissenting). And issue crucial to the legality of the conviction 
and death penalty in this case has not been decided by a majority of the Justices of this 
court on either the direct appeal or this appeal, even though it was discussed in the direct 
appeal. "On this appeal, the majority does not address the issue, which is whether a 
conviction and death penalty can be sustained on a vote of less than a majority of the 
Justice of this Court." For the reasons explained below, I would set the death penalty 
aside and remand for a new penalty hearing. This issue arises because of the divisions in 
the court in the first appeal. A jury convicted EIRoy Tillman of capital homicide and 
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imposed the death penally. A divided court affirmed the conviction and the sentence on 
appeal in State v. Tillman, 750 P.2d 546 (Utah 1987). Although Chief Justice Hall's lead 
opinion stated the position of majority of the Court on most issues, no one opinion stated 
the position of majority on all issues. Id at 550-77. Justice Stewart wrote an opinion 
concurring in part concurring in the result in part. Id at 577-82. Justice Howe also wrote 
a concurring and concurring in the result opinion. Id at 582-83. Justice Durham wrote a 
concurring and dissenting opinion, id at 583-91, as did Justice Zimmerman, id. at 591. 
Once again, Justice Stewart, dissenting: I submit that a failure of a majority of this court 
to address and resolve an issue critical to the legitimacy of a conviction and death penalty 
is an "unusual circumstances" and that the majority commits constitutional error by not 
doing so. I now address how the issue arose, why the issue was not addressed on direct 
appeal, and how I think it should be resolved. Id at 225. 
Appellant's further submit's that this case one of a complete miscarriage of justice 
that which was based on wrongful criminal capital charge of capital murder. 
CONCLUSION 
The facts and issues are plain and simple: State's information failure to met a 
pleading requirement of state and federal procedure, violating Tillman, due process and 
equal protection under the 14th Amendment. See also, Utah Rules of Criminal Procedure _ 
_Rule 4(b), and the same typ of federal Rules of Criminal Procedure Rule 7(c)(1). 
Tillman contends, "State information failed to charge any 'Essential Elements' of capital 
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murder on the grounds that it did not list any of the statutory element or any meaning of 
the offenses felonies crimes (Burglary, Aggravated Burglary, Arson, and Aggravated 
Arson) used as aggravators to support the Capital Murder charge. See, Exhibits (A-B-C-
D-F). Tillman further contends that State's failure to properly charged murder, violated 
his federal and state constitutional rights to a fair trial and jury verdict. See, State v. 
Tillman. 750 P.2d 546, id at 590-91 (1987); State v. Johnson. 821 P.2d 1150, 1158-59 
(1991). See, Exhibit B, F Utah Rules of Criminal Procedure Rule 21. (bYd) 
Verdict, and Utah Statutes of 76-6-202. Burglary: 76-6-203. Aggravated Burglary: 
76-6-102. Arson: 76-6-103. Aggravated Arson. Each felony offense or crimes (used as 
aggravators) has its OWN statute cites, punishment, and definition constituting or 
meaning of what each elements is in Utah Rules of Criminal Procedure, however, none is 
listed in 76-5-202. sub-section (d). Therefore, the issue is, does it no relieve the States of 
its burden to charge a proper legal criminal homicide, murder first degree, a capital 
offense! See, Russell v. U.S.. 369 U.S. 749-769-70 (1962). As a result of the omission. 
"Essential Elements" of the State information charge, the question, "is the States 
information charge, defective or not? See, State v. Topham. 123 P.888, 41 Ut. 39 (1912); 
U.S. v. DuBo. 186F.3d 1177, 1179-81 (9th Cir. 1999): U.S. v. Cabrerra-Teran. 168F.3d 
144.45 (5th
 c i r - 1999). u . s . y. Davis. 184 F.3d 366, 371 (4th Cir. 1999) (indictment 
charging defendant with violation of "failure to stop" statute insufficient because failed to 
allege "great bodily injury element" of offense, thus preventing defendant from preparing 
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sufficient defense). U.S. v. Landham, 251 F.3d 1072, 1082 (6th Cir 2001) (indictment 
charging violation 18 U.S.C. 875 (c) insufficient because indictment omitted 2 of 3 
essential elements of claim). See: Exhibits (A-B-C-D-F). 
Moreover, as shown throughout the Appellant's Appeal Brief, because of the 
State's use of perjured testimony in convicting him of capital first degree murder, 
including violating his state and federal constitutional rights under Brady v. Maryland, 
373 U.S. 83 (1963) in suppressing mitigating evidence by withholding pre-trial transcripts 
from the trial judge, his jury as fact finder, and Appellant's trial attorney; in turn not only 
denied him his federal and state constitutional rights to receive effective assistance of 
counsel but also denied him a fair and just trial. Thus, based on the above stated grounds, 
arguments, and cited case laws, the Appellant respectfully requests that this court either 
grant him (1) a new trial, (2) reverse his 1983 conviction of capital first degree murder or 
(3) simply order Appellant release from his unlawful imprisonment. See, Compare: U.S. 
v. Russell 411 U.S. 423, 432 (1973), holding that: Courts will dismiss informations for 
government misconduct outside the information process on due process grounds when 
such conduct is so outrageous that it violates "fundamental fairness" or is "shocking to 
the universal sense of justice." 
This is the defective information question: The State's information charged the 
Appellants Tillman's of committing burglary and arson , however, "they didn't 
inform him nor tell him what burglary and arson were, therefore, how does he knows if he 
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committed the crimes of burglary and arson"? See, Utah Rule 4(b), and federal rules _  
_ 7 (c)(1) Exhibit -D-. State information failure to meet a pleading requirement of state 
and federal procedure; "States information failed, it did not charge any essential elements 
of Capital Murder, nor it did not list any of the elements of the offense felonies crimes. 
Nor any statutory citing or language of burglary; Aggravated; burglary; Arson; 
Aggravated Arson (used as aggravators to support a capital murder. And because of it, 
this court today must reverse his 1983 State conviction of Capital 1st degree murder.) 
Dated this 2J . day of March, 2011. 
t Li AutLujL / : f„J/l/l^L*rt-S 
2011 to: 
EIRoy Tiling 
Pro Se / ' 
Mailing Certificate 
I certify that I mailed a copy of the foregoing via U.S. mail, postage prepaid, on March 
r. 
MARK SHURTLEFF 
Utah Attorney General 
160 East 300 South, 6th Floor 
P. O. Box 140854 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84114-0854 
EIRoy TillHWn 
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.; - V 
CircuitCo^t^ate^of 
SALT LAKE 
COUNTY, SALT LAKE DEPARTMENT 
Issued 
THE STATE OF UTAH 
C. Horton 
—NOTBTnU 
T- l -
VS. 
ELROY TILLMAN " ( 0 2 / 2 3 / 4 6 ) 
Defendant (s). 
(Address/DOB) 
3AQ. —
 J u d g c 
INFORMATION 
Criminal ^^© O p "A j....v.1."^ 
S CiiArnxUN y_ ; ,:—;—.—. 
The u n d e r s i g n e d — - £ ^ S £ T 3 £ d 5 « ^ committed the cnmes o. 
ur •';* oath stvtes on information ana oeu 
*>t ur,;'i:r oatn st.\i<s5> uu u**w. 
CRIMINAL HOMICIDE, MURDER FIRST DEGREE, a Capital Offense, __ 
1J60 South 1300 East, Salt Lake County, State of Utah, on 
'^ about May 26, 1982, in violation of Title 76, Chapter 5, 
''Section 202, Utah Code Annotated, 1953 as amended, in that 
the defendant, ELROY TILLMAN, intentionally or ^ pjwingly 
caused the death of Mark Allen Schoenfeld, while ^ /vLfl H 
* defendant v^s^en^a^ed in the crixaiscion of, or attempt-wig 
This information is based on evi-
dence obtained from the following 
witnesses: 
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pA&Ju C/L JU ftJL/L AS tipOOSlJ to AISIU/AJQ *Sftcitl't 
_ _. /Aci-auL^PiBAj. _ _ 
.Spec/A/ vte.Jscf'. A\h&dlc£Jkud\lcj±fh£_^£iLaiAMA£iia^mA^iJ^ 
0*1 &£HIA/nsuts SamitttJtc mtm LurhL JliJaij 
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INSTRUCTION NO 
. * * 
When you retire to consider your verdict, you will select one 
of your members to act as foreman, who, as foreman, will preside over 
your deliberations* 
Your verdict in this case must be either: 
CRIMINAL HOMICIDE, MURDER IN THE FIRST 
Guilty of DEGREE, a Capital Offense as 
charqed in the Information; or 
CRIMINAL HOMICIDE, MURDER IN THE SECOND 
Guilty of DEGREE : or 
Not Guilty; 
as your deliberations may determine. 
This being a criminal case, a unanimous concurrence of all 
jurors is required to find a verdict. Your verdict must be in writing, 
and when found, must be signed and dated by your foreman and then 
returned by you to this court. When your verdict has been found, 
notify the bailiff that you are ready t^report to the court. 
Dated at Salt Lake City, Utah KM*****' ** * * H f~*~~ 
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fliCOiMClfPaOfflCf 
In the District Court of the Third Judicial District 
in and for Salt Lake County, State of Utah 
THE STATE OF UTAH, 
Plaintiff 
v§. 
ELROY TILLMAN, 
VERDICT 
Case No. CR 82-1081 
Defendant 
We, the Jurors impaneled in the above case, having..her-eto£ore-£aund. 
..£hfi...d£f£ndan£...guil£y...a£.„Crirai^ 
A..CapA.taI...01£e.n£e.......fl;^ 
r ende r a v e r d i c t of d e a t h . 
Dated 
2ZG 
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590 Utah 
v S S ! ? ! C°U,d n 0 t 8UPP0« a eon-
asslnh ° n y m u r d e r ^cause the 
cnarge of homicide. Still other courts 
narrowly construed the neriod H 
which the felony was in Z "g 
operation of the rule. g h e 
50 PACIFIC REPORTER, 2d SERIES 
These limitations confine the scope of 
the felony-murder rule, but they do not 
resolve its essential illogic. 
Id. § 210.2, at 34-36 (citations omitted). I 
conclude that the Model Penal Code lan-
guage was intended to include killings inci-
dental to felonies and not felonies inciden-
tal to killings. 
The State concedes in its brief that the \ 
Utah death penalty statute is closely analo- < 
gous to California's, which is also modeled
 ; 
on the Model Penal Code. The California 
statutory language is "while the defendant I 
was engaged in . . . the commission of," 
language that is virtually identical to
 ; 
"while the actor was engaged in the com- j 
mission of," the Utah formulation. The j 
construction given the California statute by 
the California Supreme Court is therefore 
relevant and helpful. In People v. Green, 
27 CaLSd 1, 609 P.2d 468, 164 Cal.Rptr. 1 
(1980), that court, discussing an earlier ver-
sion of the California language which, al-
though worded differently, had an identical 
meaning, said: 
fW]e infer that the purpose of the Legis-
lature was to comply insofar as possible 
with what it understood to be the man-
date of Fitrman and Gregg et al. At the 
very least, therefore, the Legislature 
must have intended that each special cir-
cumstance provide a rational basis for 
distinguishing between those murderers 
who deserve to be considered for the 
death penalty and those who do not. The 
Legislature declared that such a distinc-
tion could be drawn, inter alia, when the 
defendant committed a "willful, deliber-
ate and premeditated" murder "during 
the commission" of a robbery or other 
listed felony. [Former § 190.2 subd. 
(c)(3).] The provision thus expressed a 
legislative belief that it was not unconsti-
tutionally arbitrary to expose to the 
death penalty those defendants who 
killed in cold blood in order to advance 
an independent felonious purpose, e.g., 
who carried out an execution-style slay-
ing of the victim of or witness to a hold-
up, a kidnapping, or a rape. 
The Legislature's goal is not achieved, 
however, when the defendant's intent is 
not to steal but to kill and the robbery is 
merely incidental to the murder . . . be-
cause its sole object is to facilitate or 
conceal the primary crime To per-
mit a jury to decide who will live and who 
will die on the basis of whether in the 
course of committing a first degree mur-
der the defendant happens to engage in 
ancillary conduct that technically consti-
tutes robbery or one of the other listed 
felonies would be to revive "the risk of 
wholly arbitrary and capricious action" 
condemned by the high court plurality in 
I Gregg. We conclude that regardless of 
chronology such a crime is not a murder 
j committed "during the commission" of a 
f robbery within the meaning of the stat-
ute. 
27 Cal.3d at 61-62, 609 P.2d at 505-06, 164 
Cal.Rptr. at 38-39 (citations omitted). It is 
logical to assume that the Utah Legislature 
intended similarly restrictive, rather than 
expansive, import to the phrase "while en-
gaged in the commission of." The use of 
the Model Penal Code language supports 
such a view, as does the reasoning used by 
the California Supreme Court in Greeny 
There is no question on this record t h a t ^ 
the felonies charged were committed t o ^ J^  
advance the killing, rather than vice versa, F^ W 
Therefore, what we have in this case is a ts> ^ 
murder coincidental!)' accomplished by r£ k? 
means of burglary and arson. Absent 
some other legitimate aggravating factors 
(several of which may have been present 
here but were not charged or proved), de-
fendant was improperly convicted of first 
degree murder, and the conviction should 
be reduced to a first degree felony. 
S 
N 
^ 
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Cite as 750 P2d 
would vacate defendant's first degree mur-
der convicSbm Because bT"prosecutorTal 
misconduct, I would also vacate the death 
penalty. Defendant is entitled to a reduc-
tion of his conviction to second degree mur-
der. Utah Code Ann. § 76-1-402(5) (1978); 
State v. Bolsinger, 699 P.2d 1214 (Utah 
1985). 
ZIMMERMAN, Justice: (concurring 
and dissenting). 
I concur with the majority in parts I, II, 
III, IV, V, VI, IX, X, and XI. I dissent 
from parts VII and VIII and join Justice 
Durham's opinion as it regards the analysis 
of the unanimity and merger questions. I 
also agree with her that with respect to the 
merger issue, the failure of the State to 
charge and prove legally sufficient aggra-
^ ^ 3 "vating circumstances requires that the 
death penalty be reversed, that the convic-
tion be reduced to second degree murder, 
and that the matter be remanded for sen-
tencing. 
(o |KEYNUMBLRSYSUM> 
STATE of Utah, Plaintiff and 
Respondent, 
v. 
Juan Dios CANTU, Defendant 
and Appellant. 
No. 860052. 
Supreme Court of Utah. 
Jan. 12, 1988. 
Defendant was convicted by jury in the 
Third District Court, Salt Lake County, 
Raymond S. Uno, J., of aggravated rob-
bery7, aggravated burglary and aggravated 
assault, and he appealed. The Supreme 
Court, Howe, J., held that: (1) evidence 
was sufficient to sustain convictions; (2) 
general exception to "parties" instructions 
was insufficient to preserve for appellate 
750P.2d-14 
. CANTU Utah 591 
591 (Utah 1988) 
review objection to giving instruction on 
accomplice liability; and (3) defendant suf-
fering from undisclosed mental illness was 
not entitled to arrest of judgment. 
Remanded with instructions. 
Zimmerman, J., filed opinion concur-
ring in result, in which Durham, J., joined. 
Orme, Court of Appeals Judge, filed 
opinion concurring in part and dissenting in 
part, in which Hall, C.J., joined. 
1. Criminal Law <S=>1144.13(2), 1159.2(7) 
Upon appeal challenging sufficiency of 
evidence to support verdict, Supreme Court 
will reverse only when evidence, viewed in 
light most favorable to verdict, is suffi-
ciently inconclusive or inherently improba-
ble that reasonable minds must have enter-
tained reasonable doubt that defendant 
committed crime of which he was convict-
ed. 
2. Assault and Battery e=>92(l) 
Burglary <©=>41(1) 
Robbery ®=>24.1(2) 
Defendant's testimony that he entered 
victim's house by prying open window, po-
lice's discovery of defendant's jacket 
stained with victim's blood in victim's 
house, and victim's identification of defend-
ant as her assailant were sufficient to sus-
tain convictions of aggravated robbery, ag-
gravated burglary and aggravated assault. 
U.C.A.1953, 76-5-103, 76-6-203, 76-6-302. 
3. Robbery <s=>24.1(2) 
Evidence that defendant accosted vic-
tim with knife and club and demanded to 
knowT where victim kept her silver and gold 
was sufficient to sustain conviction of ag-
gravated robbery, even though there was 
no evidence that anything was taken from 
person or immediate presence of victim. 
U.C.A.1953, 76-4-101, 76-6-301, 76-6-302. 
4. Criminal Law <8=>1059(2) 
General exception to "parties" instruc-
tions wras insufficient to preserve for ap-
peal alleged error in giving instruction on 
accomplice liability. U.C.A.1953, 77-35-
19(c). 
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UTAH RULES OF CRIMINAL PROCEDURE 77-35-21 i 
opportunity to defend himself. State v. 
'Howell (1982) 649 P 2d 91. 
Objections to instructions. 
| Except when necessary to avoid manifest |injustice, this rule prohibits the assigning as 
[error the trial court's failure to give a jury 
• instruction where no objection is made | before the jury is instructed; failure of trial 
court to give an instruction on the inherent 
I frailties of eyewitness identification did not 
constitute an injustice. State v. Malmrose 
(1982) 649 P 2d 56. 
I Presumption instructions. 
I Where defendant was charged with theft, 
jury instruction stating that "the law 
presumes that a person intends the reason^ 
able and ordinary consequences of his own 
\ acts" violated defendant's constitutional due 
process of law rights because under the 
instruction given, the burden of persuasion 
I ofTIhe element of intent, in the jury's mind, 
|jnay have been shifted to the defendant; the 
'jury should, at most, be instructecPtnat it 
may, on the basis of all the evidence, includ-, 
ing the inference that people usually intend 
the natural consequences of their acts, find 
that the defendant intended the natural con-
sequences of" his act. State v. Kobichaux 
(1981) 639 P 2d 207. ~ 
Where defendant was charged with theft | 
by deception, instruction to jury stating thatj' 
they "may" employ a presumption that 'The j 
ljiw presumes tnat a person intends "the rea-1 
sonable and ordinary consequences of Kis 
own acts" violated defendant's constitutional 
right to due process of law because under 
such instruction the burden of persuasion on 
the element of intent, in the mind of the 
jury, may have been shifted to the defendant; 
such error was not cured by a further 
instruction that "the evidentiary presump-
tions provided for in other instructions do 
not relieve the State of its burden to prove 
the defendant guilty beyond a reasonable 
doubt, and further do not relieve the State of 
its burden to prove each element of the par-
ticular offense being considered by you''; 
however, the jury may be instructed that it! 
"may, on the basis of all the evidence, includ- j 
ing the inference that people usually intend ! 
the natural consequences of their acts, find 
that the defendant intended the natural con-
sequences of his act." State v.'Walton (1982) 
646 P 2d 689. 
77-35-20. Rule 20 — Exceptions unnecessary. 
I Failure to object. 
i Supreme Court was precluded from reach-
ing on appeal the issue if prosecutor's state-
ments constituted an impermissible comment 
upon defendant's right not to testify where 
defendant did not object at trial to the state-
ments. State v. Hales (1982) 652 P 2d 1290. 
^^^^O^^^BS^ae^M The verdict of the jury shall be either 
"guilty" or "not 'guilty/ ' "not guilty by reason of insanity," "guilty and mentally 
ill," or "not guilty of the crime charged but guilty of a. lesser included offense, 
or "not guilty of the crime charged but guilty of a lesser included offense and men-
tally ill" provided that when the defense of mental illness has been asserted and 
the defendant is acquitted on the ground that he was mentally tW insane at the 
time of the commission of the offense charged, the verdict shall be "not guilty by 
reason of mental illness insanity." j 
1 * % ^ It shall be returned by the jury to the judge • 
in open court and in the presence of the defendant and counsel. If the defendant 
voluntarily absents himself, the verdict may be received in his absence. 
(c) If there are two or more defendants, the jury at any time during its deliber-
ations may return a verdict or verdicts with respect to any defendant as to whom 
it has agreed. If the jury cannot agree with respect to all, the defendant or defend-
a n t s ^ i to^^ whom it does jiot agree may be tried again. 
"^  tt than one offense,:charged, 
^ § M ^ separately i n S e 
yeiciiet. ™-?-T- w"-~ 
•:*: (e) The jury may return a verdict of guilty to the offense charged or to any -j 
offense necessarily included in the offense charged or an attempt to commit either j 
the offense charged or .an offense necessarily included therein. 
I J l l ^ F When§a>;ySrdicf JL Before it-is recorded^the jury shall be polled
 ( 
hat ^ ~ iuest o f \ & ; o r ' be polled at thejfflrffs own instance. If^  upon' 
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
77-35-21.5 CODE OF CRIMINAL PROCEDURE j 
the poll, there is not unanimous concurrence,. thejVur^m,^^ 
for further deliberations or may be'discharged. If the-;v^gi^ 
be recorded. 
^(g) If judgment of acquittal is given on a verdict or the case is dismissed and 
the defendant is not detained for any other legal cause, he shall be disrharflftd as 
soon as the judgment is given. If a verdict of guilty is returned, .the-*eourt may 
order the defendant to be taken into custody to await judgment on the verdict or 
may permit the defendant to remain on bail. 
History: C. 1953, 77-35-21, enacted by L. 
1980, ch. 14, § 1; L. 1983, ch. 49, § 7. : 
77-35-21.5. Plea claiming mental illness or insanity — Procedure — Verdict 
— Sentence — Commitment — Discharge — Probation. (1) Upon a plea of 
guilty and mentally ill being tendered by a defendant to any charge, the court shall 
hold a hearing within a reasonable tinre to determine the claim of mental illness 
of the defendant. Mental illness, for this purpose, is determined by the definition 
stated in section 64-7-28.ThB~ court may order the defendant to be evaluated at 
the Utah state hospital or any other suitable facility, and may receive the evidence 
of any private or public expert witness whose evidence is offered by the defendant 
or the prosecutor. A defendant who tenders a plea of "guilty and mentally "ill" shall 
be examined first by the trial judge in compliance wjth the standards for taking 
pleas of guilty. The defendant shall be. advised that a plea of guilty and mentally 
ill is a plea of guilty and not a contingent plea. If the defendant is thereafter >found 
not to be mentally ill, a guilty plea otherwise lawfully made remains a valid plea 
of guilty and the defendant shall be sentenced as any other offender; If the court 
concludes that the defendant is currently mentally ill, applying the standards set 
forth in this section, the defendant's plea shall be accepted and he shall be sen-
tenced as a mentally ill offender. 
j (2) If a defendant at trial asserts a defense of "not guilty by reason of insanity," 
the court shall instruct the jury that they may find the defendant guilty, not guilty, 
not guilty by reason of insanity, guilty and mentally ill, guilty of a lesser offense, 
or guilty of a lesser offense due to mental illness but not such illness as would 
warrant full exoneration. Upon a verdict of guilty and mentally ill to the offense 
charged, or any lesser offense, the court shall hold a hearing as provided in this 
section, and if the court finds that the defendant is currently mentally ill, it shall 
sentence the defendant as a mentally ill offender. 
(3) If the defendant is found guilty and mentally ill, the court shall impose any 
sentence which could be imposed pursuant to law upon a defendant who is con-
victed of the same offense. Before sentencing, the court shall conduct a hearing 
to determine the defendant's present mental state. 
(4) The court shall in its sentence order hospitalization at the Utah state hospi-
tal or other suitable facility if, upon completion of the hearing and consideration 
of the record, the court finds by clear and convincing evidence that: 
(a) The defendant has a mental illness as defined by section 64-7-28(1); 
(b) Because of his mental illness the defendant poses an immediate physical 
danger to others or self, which may include jeopardizing his own or others safety, 
health, or welfare if placed in a correctional or probation setting, or lacks the abil-
ityjto provide the basic necessities of life, such as food, clothing and shelter, if 
placid on probation; 
(c) The defendant lacks the ability to engage in a rational decision-making pro-
cess regarding the acceptance of mental treatment as demonstrated by evidence 
of inability to weigh tHefpossible costs and benefits of treatment; 
(d) There is no appropriate treatment •«•,•
 L t ive t o , i iour t o rder of K ~ ^ t a l -
ization; and ..!•-.. _ '%• . j , ^ •xf '^o "*,.:. ..;,.,,»•• " - • « / " 
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2 B DESSRET NEWS. WEb. P.M./rHURS. A.M., CIS. 23-24.1987; 
Tillman case troubled Utah's justices 
Split decision sustaining death penalty signals long appellate process 
By Brett DelPorto 
Oeserel News staff writer 
A prosecutor says the Utah Supreme Court's 3-
2 decision upholding the death penalty and con-
viction of ax-murderer Elroy Tulman may fore-
shadow future difficulties as the case snakes its 
way through the Jong appellate process. 
'There were some tough issues'* in the Tillman 
case, Assistant Utah Attorney General David B. 
Thompson said Wednesday. TTm confident that 
the decision is sustainable throughout the appeals 
process, but that doesn't mean there's not going to 
be some pretty good fights." 
ChM|Justice Gordon R. Hall, writing for the 
majorityf wrote that alleged errors during Till-
man's trial did not warrant a new trial.. 
"Defendant's conviction and sentence are In all 
respects affirmed,'1 Hall wrote in the 72-page 
ruling. 
The difficulty of the case is evident from the 
fact that the justices wrote five different opinions. 
Justices Richard C. Howe and I#D^e^5i|wart 
concurred in the outcome and so joined In the 
majority opinion, but they also wrote separate 
opinions outlining their disagreements. 
And Justices Christine R. Durham and Michael 
D. Zimmerman disagreed outright .and wrote in 
dissenting opinions that Tillman's Sentence shoufd 
have been reduced to second-degree murder.; 
Durham said the absence of a unanimousirer> 
diet on the aggravating circumstance of the crime 
and prosecutorial misconduct means that both the 
inurder conviction and the death sentence should 
be vacated. .," 
"Defendant is entitled to a reductipn of his con-
viction to second-degree murder,11 Durham wrote. 
The prosecutorial misconduct charge concerns 
defense claims that Deputy Salt Lake County .At-
torney Michael Christensen acted improperly in 
Sesting Tillman's j^fttsal to t^s^y on his ouTi 
?
 implied he was guilty. . - * 
But Hall said reviewing the remarks in context 
indicates they need not be construed as a comment 
on Tiiiman's silence. 
Tillman, M, was convicted of the May 26,1982, 
murder of Mark Allen Schoenfeld, who was struck 
with an ax and set afire while sleeping at his home. 
According to trial testimony, Schoenfeld was daU 
Lng Tillman's ex-girlfriend. 
Tillman's January 1983 conviction had been on 
appeal before the court for two years — longer 
than any other deatb-penalty case. 
•;., ^Thompson said the length of time spent 
case and the long, disjointed opinion indie 
issues raised on appeal were troubling to t 
tices. He said there were two main issue 
concerning the Utah death-penalty statute a 
other concerning the jury's verdict 
The questions about the death penalty o 
',• whether first-degree murder is appropriate 
I a person commits other offenses in order \ 
f ther a murder. In Tillman's case, burglaf 
: arsbn — the two aggravating circumstance 
• porting the first-degree murder convictj 
were committed to further the murder 
; than the other way around. 
"He clearly committed the burglary and 
in order to kill this guy," Thompson said.' 
other courts have said it's not first-degree n 
when you commit the underlying felony in 
to further the murder, as opposed to the 
way around." 
Another major issue was the %mFpm*mm$ 
the aggravalin^cawmsfemces necessary fi 
first-degree murder convicUon. Because t 
m^di^r?etsm^fv whether the arson or tlf 
oreUcally passible that someronki have tim 
fi^*s^^b^n!derlym^!ohywassf^lied. 
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